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“The problem of the Twentieth Century” has yet to be resolved. For nearly every outcome of
importance, the distributions of blacks and whites in the United States are dramatically diﬀerent.
The gaps between black and white children in educational outcomes such as test scores (Reardon
(2008)) and attainment (Heckman and LaFontaine (2010)) are well documented. These gaps are
associated with later outcomes of importance: early skill diﬀerences are able to explain a large
share of the subsequent racial earnings gap (Neal and Johnson (1996), Keane and Wolpin (2000)),
and Pettit and Western (2004) estimate that for black (white) males aged 30-34 in 1999, nearly
59% (11%) of high school dropouts had spent time in prison. African Americans are also exposed
to much higher levels of violence than their white counterparts. In 2006 the homicide death rate
of black males between 15-34 was approximately 8 times that of white males (NCHS (2009)), as it
had been for years (Figure 1).
Although these outcomes have received much attention from social scientists, the mechanisms
maintaining racial gaps are not well understood. One prominent theory proposes that neighborhood
eﬀects can explain these diﬀerences in outcomes. Wilson (1987) presents empirical evidence that
urban poverty in the US, in particular that of predominantly African American neighborhoods,
has become highly concentrated over recent decades. For example, the number of people living in
census tracts with poverty rates of 40% or more increased from 4.1 to 8.0 million between 1970
and 1990 (Ludwig et al. (2001)).1 Wilson (1987) posits that growing up in a neighborhood of such
concentrated poverty tends to have negative eﬀects on outcomes.2
Policy makers have looked to housing mobility programs as a way to mitigate the adverse eﬀects
of concentrated poverty ever since the promising results of the Gautreaux program. The Gautreaux
program relocated public housing residents in Chicago through housing vouchers in a quasi-random
manner. Those who moved to low-poverty suburbs through Gautreaux had much better education
and labor market outcomes than those who moved to city neighborhoods (Rosenbaum (1995)).
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) was a housing mobility experiment conducted in ﬁve US cities
seeking to replicate the quasi-experimental results from Gautreaux. Households living in high-
poverty neighborhoods were allowed to enter a lottery for housing vouchers. In a tremendous
disappointment to researchers and all those hoping to live in a society with equality of opportunity,
MTO did not appear to reproduce the beneﬁcial eﬀects found in Gautreaux.
In addition to studying the eﬀects of speciﬁc housing voucher policies, researchers have inter-
preted estimates of the eﬀects of moving through MTO as neighborhood eﬀects. This paper argues
that such an interpretation of results from MTO conﬂates program eﬀects with neighborhood ef-
fects. This paper uses assigned treatment in MTO as an instrumental variable to estimate the
LATEs of various neighborhood treatments induced by changes in this instrument. The neighbor-
1However, this number dropped in the 1990s (Jargowsky (2003)).
2The neighborhood eﬀects considered in this paper are those associated with living in a neighborhood in the US
characterized by this “new urban poverty” (Wilson (1996)), but there are many alternative deﬁnitions of neighborhood
eﬀects (Durlauf (2004)).
2hood treatments induced by MTO are ascertained by comparing the neighborhood characteristics of
the MTO groups, and a key lesson from this exercise is that alternative housing mobility programs
might result in diﬀerent neighborhood eﬀects than those observed in MTO. That is, the LATE is
deﬁned by the subgroup of compliers, and thus diﬀerent instruments will result in diﬀerent LATE
parameters if they induce diﬀerent subpopulations to select into treatment (Heckman (1997)).
Estimating LATEs from MTO helps to clarify that while parameters estimated in the literature
do not suﬀer from selection bias (Ludwig et al. (2008)), selection into treatment is an inescapable
issue if one seeks to learn about neighborhood eﬀects from MTO (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey
(2008)). Preliminary estimates indicate that many LATE neighborhood eﬀects will be larger than
the TOT program eﬀects from MTO. For example, it is shown that moving to a neighborhood
with a high degree of personal safety, moving to an integrated neighborhood, and moving to a
neighborhood with a high level of collective eﬃcacy through MTO all have much larger eﬀects
on adult outcomes than moving to a low-poverty neighborhood through MTO. Because LATE
parameters are deﬁned by the subpopulation of compliers, these neighborhood eﬀects pertain to
much smaller shares of MTO households than the program eﬀects reported in the literature, since
the assigned treatment of housing vouchers only induced a small fraction of MTO households to
receive these neighborhood treatments. While the current analysis is only able to estimate a subset
of LATE parameters of interest using publicly available information on MTO, future analyses to
be conducted on restricted access data will illustrate these issues further.
This re-interpretation of the MTO data suggests two important conclusions related to the
current understanding of neighborhood eﬀects and programs. First, if alternative housing mobility
programs were designed to induce moves to neighborhoods with characteristics other than low
poverty, it is entirely feasible that such programs might induce larger eﬀects than MTO. Second,
initial LATE estimates appear to reconcile the evidence from MTO with prevailing theories of
neighborhood eﬀects (Wilson (1987)).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the MTO experiment and presents some
descriptive statistics. Section 3 draws heavily from the line of research summarized in Heckman
(2010) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to deﬁne and interpret LATE parameters when assigned
treatment is viewed as an instrumental variable. A summary of the program eﬀects found in the
literature is presented in Section 4. Section 5 ﬁrst discusses the implications of the LATE for
the interpretation of neighborhood eﬀect parameters. Section 5 next deﬁnes several neighborhood
treatments and then presents estimates of their LATEs resulting from MTO. Section 6 concludes.
2 Moving To Opportunity (MTO)
Moving To Opportunity (MTO) was inspired by the promising results of the Gautreaux pro-
gram. At the same time that much attention was being devoted to the increasing concentration
of poverty in the US (Wilson (1987)), results from the Gautreaux program indicated that hous-
ing mobility could be an eﬀective policy to mitigate the adverse eﬀects of concentrated poverty.
3Following a class-action lawsuit led by Dorothy Gautreaux, in 1976 the Supreme Court ordered
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Chicago Housing Author-
ity (CHA) to remedy the extreme racial segregation experienced by public-housing residents in
Chicago. The resulting program created by HUD and CHA gave families awarded Section 8 public
housing vouchers the ability to use them beyond the territory of CHA.
Speciﬁcally, the Gautreaux court ruling allowed families to be relocated either to suburbs that
were at least 70 percent white or to black neighborhoods in the city that were forecast to undergo
“revitalization” (Polikoﬀ (2006)). Although families awarded Section 8 certiﬁcates were eventually
trained to ﬁnd their own housing, the initial relocation process of the Gautreaux program created a
quasi-experiment, as families at the top of a waiting list were matched to neighborhoods based on
the availability of housing units (Polikoﬀ (2006)). Relative to city movers, suburban movers from
Gautreaux were more likely to be employed, and the children of suburban movers attended better
schools, were more likely to complete high school, attend college, be employed, and had higher
wages than their city mover counterparts (Rosenbaum (1995)).3
In the wake of this promising evidence from Gautreaux, there was bipartisan support for at-
tempts to decentralize poverty and improve outcomes through housing vouchers (Goering (2003)).
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 authorized HUD to “assist very low-income
families with children who reside in public housing or housing receiving project-based assistance
... to move out of areas with high concentrations of persons living in poverty to areas with low
concentrations of such persons” (Goering (2003)).4 MTO oﬀered housing vouchers to eligible house-
holds between September 1994 and July 1998 in ﬁve US cities; Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and New York (Goering (2003)). Households were eligible to participate in MTO if they
were low-income, had at least one child under 18, were residing in either public housing or Section 8
project-based housing located in a census tract with a poverty rate of at least 40%, were current in
their rent payment, and all families members were on the current lease and were without criminal
records (Orr et al. (2003)).
In addition to implementing the program, Congress also required that HUD conduct evaluations
of the demonstration (Goering (2003)). HUD contracted with Abt Associates to implement a social
experiment by randomly assigning households to various treatments. This was achieved by adding
households to a waiting list after they volunteered to take part in MTO. Between 1994 and 1997
families were drawn from the waiting list through a random lottery. After being drawn, families
were randomly allocated into one of three treatment groups; the experimental group, the Section-
8 only comparison group, and the control group. The experimental group was oﬀered Section 8
housing vouchers, but were restricted to using them in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of
less than 10 percent. However, after one year had passed, families in the experimental group were
3It has also been found that suburban movers have much lower male youth mortality rates Votruba and Kling
(2009) and tend to stay in high-income suburban neighborhoods many years after their initial placement
(DeLuca and Rosenbaum (2003), Keels et al. (2005)).
4The threshold for high-poverty was set to follow the common cutoﬀ considered in the social sciences - census
tracts with 40% or more of residents poor, while the threshold of low poverty was set at the median tract-level poverty
rate in 1990 - 10% (Goering (2003)).
4then unrestricted in where they used their Section 8 vouchers. Families in this group were also
provided with counseling and education [on housing markets/home ﬁnances?] through a local non-
proﬁt. Families in the Section-8 only comparison group were provided with no counseling, and
were oﬀered Section 8 housing vouchers without any restriction on their place of use. And families
in the control group received project-based assistance. More information on MTO may be found
on HUD’s MTO webpage or the following online repository of papers on MTO.
2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Due to the detailed geographic information they contain, the data from MTO are neither
publicly nor privately available. As a result all of the data used in the current paper have been
collected from the literature. The current results should be viewed as an interim analysis, as a
request for access to the MTO Restricted Access Data has been made by the author.
There were 4,248 (4,610) accepted (applicant) families, with 1,310 (1,440) families in the con-
trol group, 1,209 (1,350) families in the Section 8 only group, and 1,729 (1,820) families in the
experimental group (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Clark (2008)). Around two-thirds of the families
who volunteered for the program were African-American, while most of the rest were Hispanic
(Kling et al. (2005), Table F13 in Kling et al. (2007b)). About 25% of eligible families applied to
participate in MTO (Ludwig et al. (2001)). Compared to those who did not move, those in the
treatment groups who moved through MTO were younger, more likely to have no teenage children,
to have reported a neighborhood that is very unsafe at night, to have been very dissatisﬁed with
their apartment, to have been enrolled in school, and to have had conﬁdence in their ability to
move through the voucher program (Kling et al. (2007a))
3 The Identiﬁcation of Treatment Eﬀects in Social Experiments
Before interpreting results from MTO, we ﬁrst deﬁne and state identifying assumptions for the
treatment eﬀects found in the MTO literature. Consider a standard framework for studying causal
treatment eﬀects (Holland (1986), Rubin (1974), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)). Let Yi(1) and Yi(0)
be random variables associated with the potential outcomes in the treated and untreated states,






1 if treatment is received;
0 if treatment is not received.
The measured outcome variable Yi is
Yi = DiYi(1) + (1 − Di)Yi(0). (1)
Since both treatment states are not observable for any individual i, inference cannot be drawn
about the value of Yi(1)−Yi(0). However, causal inference about population averages can be made
5under speciﬁc assumptions. One such assumption that allows for inference about average eﬀects
on a population, which Holland (1986) calls Independence, is that:
E[Yi(1)] = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]
E[Yi(0)] = E[Yi(0)|Di = 0].
This assumption is typically operationalized by the researcher’s random assignment of individuals










as an unbiased estimator of the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE):5
βATE = E[Y (1) − Y (0)].
There are two reasons the ATE deﬁned above is typically not the primary interest of researchers
in the social sciences. First, the ATE measures the average response to treatment in the entire
population. Nearly all social programs are targeted to a speciﬁc subpopulation hypothesized to
beneﬁt from the program. Second, it is rarely feasible to estimate the ATE in social settings.
Individuals are able to choose whether or not to participate in programs, such as job training pro-
grams (LaLonde (1995)), Head Start (Ludwig and Miller (2007), Garces et al. (2002)), or housing
mobility programs like Gautreaux and MTO.
3.1 Assigned Treatment and Selection into Treatment
Since the parameters of interest in evaluating programs are often deﬁned in terms of the subpop-
ulation receiving treatment, we model how individuals select into treatment. We begin by noting
that in the case of social experiments, a researcher can typically control assignment but not receipt





1 if treatment is assigned;
0 if treatment is not assigned.
Since it need not be true that D = Z, we write D(Z) to denote the treatment received when
assigned treatment Z. Furthermore, suppose there is a latent index D∗ that depends on assigned
treatment Z and some unobserved component U as follows:
D∗ = µ(Z) − U, (2)
5From this point forward individual subscripts i will be dropped, but it is understood that expectations are taken
over the population of individuals.





1 if D∗ ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
(3)
We follow Heckman and Vytlacil (2000) and assume:
Assumption 1 Y (0), Y (1), and D(z) are jointly independent of Z
Assumption 2 E[Y (1)] < ∞ and E[Y (0)] < ∞
Assumption 3 µ(Z) is a non-degenerate random variable
Assumption 4 U ∼ U[0,1]
Note that there is no loss of generality for the selection model in Equations 2 and 3 by making
Assumptions 3 and 4. As noted in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), Assumptions 3 and 4 imply
that if D∗ = v(Z) − V , we may equate the two models by writing µ(Z) = FV (v(Z)) and U =
FV (V (Z)). We write the propensity score as P(z) = Pr(D = 1|Z = z). Note that Assumption
4 implies µ(z) = P(z) when µ(z) ∈ [0,1]; in the discussion that follows, µ(z) and P(z) are used
interchangeably depending on which term better facilitates interpretation.
Table 1 shows how the labels in Angrist et al. (1996) apply to individuals due to their response
to treatment assignment. Figure 2 shows how these labels are generated by the selection model in
Equations 2 and 3, and we focus on the case displayed in Figure 2a. Note that since the unobservable
component of the latent index is distributed according to a uniform [0,1] distribution, U ∼ U[0,1],
then treatment does not depend on U or Z if both µ(Z = 0) < 0 and µ(Z = 1) < 0, or if both
µ(Z = 0) ≥ 1 and µ(Z = 1) ≥ 1. Speciﬁcally, if µ(Z) < 0 for both Z = 0,1, then an individual is
a never-taker, while if µ(Z) ≥ 1 for both Z = 0,1, then an individual is an always-taker.
It is when µ(Z) ∈ (0,1) that treatment depends on both assigned treatment and the unobserved
component of the latent index, U. Consider the situation portrayed by D∗ = µ1(Z)−U1 in Figure
2a. In the case that 0 < µ1(Z = 0) < µ1(Z = 1) < 1, assigning treatment to an individual makes
them more likely to participate. Individuals with u ∈ [0,µ1(Z = 0)) are always takers, those with
u ∈ [µ1(Z = 0),µ1(Z = 1)) are compliers, and those with u ∈ [µ1(Z = 1),1) are never-takers.6
Note that if D∗ = µ1(Z) − U1 for all individuals as in Figure 2a, then there are no deﬁers.7
Furthermore, if all individuals select into treatment according to D∗ = µ1(Z) − U1 and it is the
case that µ1(Z = 0) ≤ 0 and µ1(Z = 1) ∈ (0,1), then there are no always takers, only compliers
6Throughout this paper the word complier will be deﬁned as in Angrist et al. (1996).
7In order for the selection model in Equations 2 and 3 to produce deﬁers, some subpopulation would have to
select into treatment according to D
∗ = µ1(Z) − U1 with µ1(Z = 1) > µ1(Z = 0), while another subpopulation
would have to select into treatment according to D
∗ = µ2(Z) − U2 with µ2(Z = 1) < µ2(Z = 0). This could
be an example of essential heterogeneity as deﬁned in Heckman et al. (2006). Related examples include the way
parents select their children into the treatment of kindergarten entrance age (Aliprantis (2010)) and the way students
select into attaining a GED, graduating from high school, or dropping out of high school in response to easing
GED requirements (Heckman and Urz´ ua (2010)). The assumption of monotonicity introduced in Imbens and Angrist
(1994), and presented shortly in Assumption 5, rules out the possibility of deﬁers.
7and never-takers. When D = 1 is deﬁned as use of a voucher oﬀered by the MTO program,
this is a reasonable way of modeling selection into treatment, as families could not have used a
voucher through the MTO program unless they were assigned a voucher through the MTO program.
However, under alternative deﬁnitions of D = 1, particularly those in which D = 1 is moving to
a neighborhood with a particular characteristic, assuming µ1(Z = 0) ≤ 0 may be unreasonable.
Determining whether µi(Z = 0) < 0 or µi(Z = 0) ∈ (0,1) will depend on the deﬁnition of treatment,
which will in turn determine how we interpret parameter estimates.
3.2 The ITT, LATE, and TOT Parameters
Given our joint model of outcomes (Equation 1) and selection into treatment (Equations 2 and
3), we now consider the assumptions necessary to identify parameters of interest. We will use this
joint model to deﬁne and interpret these parameters. We begin by comparing the outcome variable
Y at two diﬀerent values of treatment assignment, Z = 1 and Z = 0, to obtain the Wald estimator:
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
= E[D(1)Y (1) + (1 − D(1))Y (0)|Z = 1] − E[D(0)Y (1) + (1 − D(0))Y (0)|Z = 0]
= E[(D(1) − D(0))(Y (1) − Y (0))] (4)
= Pr[D(1) − D(0) = 1]E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) − D(0) = 1] (5)
+ Pr[D(1) − D(0) = −1]E[Y (0) − Y (1)|D(1) − D(0) = −1].
Equation 4 follows from Assumption 1, and Assumption 2 ensures the Wald estimator is ﬁnite.
One causal parameter of interest is the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) eﬀect, which is the causal eﬀect
of treatment assignment on outcomes:
βITT ≡ E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]. (6)
The only assumptions necessary to identify the ITT eﬀect from the Wald estimator in Equation 5
are Assumptions 1 and 2. Under these assumptions, Equation 5 represents a comparison of weighted
average outcomes between those individuals who “switch-in” (compliers) and those who “switch-
out” (deﬁers) of treatment due to changes in assigned treatment. The outcomes of those whose
treatment is not aﬀected by assigned treatment, always-takers and never-takers, do not contribute
to this estimate.
Researchers are usually interested in how receiving treatment aﬀects outcomes. Since the ITT
parameter can only be interpreted as the eﬀect of assigning treatment to units/individuals, it is
uninformative to researchers on this topic. Thus there is interest in using Equation 5 to identify
treatment eﬀects that go beyond the ITT and inform us about the eﬀect of treatment on outcomes.8
Much of the literature on instrumental variables does this by placing restrictions on how changes
8To be clear, this paper refers to the treatment actually received by a unit as treatment and the treatment assigned
to a unit as assigned treatment.
8in the instrument induce changes in treatment (ie, on the selection model in Equations 2 and
3.). In the case of a social experiment like MTO, the instrument is assigned treatment (Heckman
(1996)). Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist and Imbens (1995) develop several assumptions
made on the selection model in Equations 2 and 3 that allow for the identiﬁcation of treatment
eﬀects when combined with Assumptions 1–4. For example, in the context of our selection model,
the monotonicity assumption introduced in Imbens and Angrist (1994) is:
Assumption 5a µ(Z = 0) < µ(Z = 1) for all individuals
Assumption 5b At least one of {µ(Z = 0),µ(Z = 1)} is in (0,1) for all individuals
Assumption 3 implies that µ(Z = 0)  = µ(Z = 1), and Assumption 5 ensures that being assigned
to treatment makes no individuals less likely to receive treatment, while at the same time ensuring
that some individuals are induced to receive treatment due to the instrument. That is, together
with Assumptions 1-4, Assumption 5 ensures that Pr[D(1)−D(0) = −1] = 0 and Pr[D(1)−D(0) =
1]  = 0, so the Wald estimator from Equation 5 identiﬁes
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) − D(0) = 1] =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
Pr[D(1) − D(0) = 1]
. (7)
The Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) is the average eﬀect of treatment on outcome Y for
those who can be induced to change treatment by a change in assigned treatment. That is, the
LATE informs us about the average eﬀect of treatment on compliers.
Alternatively, the researcher may believe that there are no always-takers (ie, that Pr[D(0) =
1] = 0). In the context of our selection model, we might assume:
Assumption 6 µ(Z = 0) < 0 and µ(Z = 1) ∈ (0,1) for all individuals
Under Assumptions 1-4 and 6, the Wald estimator allows us to identify
βTOT ≡ E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) = 1] =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
Pr[D(1) = 1]
. (8)
The Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) eﬀect is deﬁned as the average change in outcome for those
who are treated, or the average eﬀect of treatment over both compliers and always-takers. Note that
Assumption 6 implies Assumption 5, but Assumption 5 does not imply Assumption 6. Assumption
6 is the special case of Assumption 5 in which there are no always-takers, and note that under
Assumption 6 the LATE and TOT parameters will coincide:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) = βTOT = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|D(1) = 1] =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
Pr[D(1) = 1]
.
Alternatively, as pointed out in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), the TOT and LATE parameters
can be seen as the average value of Y (1)−Y (0) for U lying in diﬀerent intervals. Under the selection
model in Equations 2 and 3, together with Assumptions 1-5, the following parameters exist and
9are ﬁnite:
βTOT = E[Y (1) − Y (0) | U ≤ µ(Z = 1)]
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) = E[Y (1) − Y (0) | µ(Z = 0) ≤ U < µ(Z = 1)].
As stated earlier, when µ1(Z = 0) ≤ 0, then these two parameters are the same. Further discussion
of these parameters may be found in Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005),
Heckman (2010), Angrist et al. (1996), and Imbens and Angrist (1994).
4 Program Eﬀects
The ITT eﬀects identiﬁed in the literature on MTO compare the outcomes of those oﬀered a
housing voucher with the outcomes of households who were not oﬀered a housing voucher. These
parameters have a clear policy interpretation: they are the eﬀects on outcomes from being oﬀered
a housing voucher through the MTO program. And since the oﬀer of a housing voucher (Z = 1, or
assigned treatment) was randomly allocated to households, these eﬀects should be interpreted as
causal eﬀects. Based on the outcomes of Gautreaux (Rosenbaum (1995)), researchers expected to
ﬁnd universally positive eﬀects of moving through MTO (Kling et al. (2007a), Sanbonmatsu et al.
(2006)). In contrast to researchers’ expectations, the data show that the eﬀects of the program
were mixed.
There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects on earnings, welfare participation, or the amount of government
assistance adults received 5 years after randomization (Kling et al. (2007a)). There was also little
eﬀect on adult physical health: No statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on self-reported overall health,
hypertension, or asthma (Kling et al. (2007a)). The single improvement in adult outcomes - a
5 percentage point reduction in adult obesity for the experimental group relative to the control
group - cannot be distinguished from statistical aberration since there are multiple hypotheses
being tested simultaneously (Kling et al. (2007a)).
However, there were positive ITT eﬀects on measures of adult mental health such as distress and
calmness (Tables III in Kling et al. (2007a) and F5 in Kling et al. (2007b)). In fact, the magnitude
of the improvements in adult mental health were comparable to the most eﬀective clinical and
pharmacological interventions (Kling et al. (2007a)). Kling et al. (2007a) hypothesize that this
improvement in mental health is due to a reduction in the fear of random violence. A related
outcome is that adults in the experimental group were much less likely to report that police do not
come when called in the neighborhood (Table II and p 102 of Kling et al. (2005)).
Improved outcomes for young females were found in the groups oﬀered a housing voucher
through MTO. For young females ages 15-25 in 2001 (4-7 years after randomization), Kling et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of being assigned to the experimental group is about one-third fewer
arrests for violent and property crimes relative to the control group. Kling et al. (2007a) analyze
results from MTO youth aged 15-20 at all ﬁve sites an average of ﬁve years after random assignment.
They ﬁnd positive ITT eﬀects for female youth that are largest with respect to mental health and
10still substantial for education and risky behavior (Kling et al. (2007a), Table G2 in Kling et al.
(2007b)).
MTO had negative ITT eﬀects on the outcomes of young males. The eﬀects on young males
were a deterioration in physical health and an increase in risky behavior, smoking and non-sports
injuries (Kling et al. (2007a)), as well as an increase in the fraction of days absent from school and
the probability of having a friend who uses drugs (Kling et al. (2005), Table IX). While Kling et al.
(2005) ﬁnd statistically insigniﬁcant changes in violent crime arrests, they also ﬁnd a positive ITT
eﬀect of about one-third of the control group mean for property crime arrests. After considering
empirical evidence on three reasons for these gender diﬀerences - peer sorting, coping strategies, and
a comparative advantage in property oﬀending - Kling et al. (2005) conclude that these outcomes
result from boys being more likely to take advantage of a newfound comparative advantage in prop-
erty oﬀending in their new neighborhoods.9 The dynamics of these behaviors are interesting, as
young males have signiﬁcantly lower violent crime arrests in the ﬁrst two years after random assign-
ment, but property crime rates then increase signiﬁcantly starting 3 and 4 years after assignment
(Kling et al. (2005), Table V).
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) examine test score data collected in 2002 for MTO children who
were 6-20 on December 31, 2001 and ﬁnd no evidence of improvements in reading scores, math
scores, behavior problems, or school engagement. Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) ﬁrst combine reading
and math test scores (Woodcock-Johnson Revised scores) and estimate ITT eﬀects for all ages,
as well as by subgroups of 6-10, 11-14, and 15-20. The ITT eﬀects for the combined reading and
math scores are neither statistically signiﬁcant for any age subgroup nor for all ages together (p
673). When Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006) examine ITT eﬀects for several other educational outcomes,
such as grade repetition, suspensions, measures of school engagement such tardiness and paying
attention in class, they ﬁnd only one ITT eﬀect to be statistically signiﬁcant: the eﬀect of being
oﬀered a voucher actually increases problem behaviors for youth aged 11-14 (p 673).
The only achievement test eﬀect for subgroups that is statistically signiﬁcant is a positive
experimental ITT on reading for African-American children (p 678). The positive impacts on
test scores were only found in Baltimore and Chicago (Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), p 678). These
sites were almost entirely African-American (unlike the other sites, which also had some Hispanic
households), and also had higher crime rates (Burdick-Will et al. (2009)).
5 Neighborhood Eﬀects
There is considerable controversy surrounding the interpretation of results from MTO as neigh-
borhood eﬀects. One interpretation of results argues that selection into treatment biases parameter
estimates (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008)). An opposing interpretation is that randomiza-
9An interesting note from Kling et al. (2005) is that these eﬀects seem to be driven by the number of arrests for
those who are criminally involved, rather than the rate of participation in criminal activity (p 102). However, eﬀects
are similar for those with and without histories of anti-social behaviors prior to random assignment, such as arrest,
expulsion from school, or parents called to school for problems (p 112).
11tion makes selection unimportant for the estimation and interpretation of treatment eﬀects from
MTO. A quote from Ludwig et al. (2008) summarizes this view: “Randomization ... solves the
selection problem, by causing variation in neighborhood of residence to occur for reasons that are
uncorrelated with individual characteristics, whether or not those characteristics are measurable.”10
How can we reconcile these opposing views? We begin by noting that “The critical feature of
the problem of evaluating a treatment under imperfect compliance is that even if assignment Zi is
random or ignorable, the actual receipt of treatment Di is typically nonignorable [or nonrandom]”
(Angrist et al. (1996), p 447). Randomization occurred in MTO at the level of assigned treatment
(Z ∈ {0,1}), not at the level of treatment (D ∈ {0,1}). Thus households were able to choose
whether or not to move after receiving their assigned treatment, and these choices were not made
randomly. It is for this reason that we can expect variation in neighborhood of residence between
compliers, always-takers, and never-takers to be correlated with individual characteristics.11 This
was precisely the case in MTO: Compared to those who did not move, those in the treatment groups
who moved through MTO were younger, more likely to have no teenage children, to have reported
a neighborhood that is very unsafe at night, to have been very dissatisﬁed with their apartment,
to have been enrolled in school, and to have had conﬁdence in their ability to move through the
voucher program (Kling et al. (2007a), p 86).
Thinking about variation in neighborhood of residence by the subgroups in Table 1 is helpful
because it clariﬁes that we can only expect variation in neighborhood of residence induced by
randomization to be uncorrelated with individual characteristics within subgroups. But since there
should be no experimentally induced variation in neighborhood of residence within the group of
always-takers, and the same should be true within the group of never-takers, housing vouchers
oﬀered through MTO should only have induced variation in neighborhood of residence for the
subgroup of compliers. Thus, while it is true that randomization in MTO did indeed induce
variation in neighborhood of residence that was uncorrelated with individual characteristics, this
statement is only true within the subgroup of compliers.
What are the consequences of exogenous variation in neighborhood of residence being restricted
to the subgroup of compliers? On the one hand, this point has no implications for reinterpreting
estimates of program eﬀects found in the literature. One set of such eﬀects are ITT eﬀects for
which treatment is deﬁned as “being oﬀered a housing voucher through MTO.” Another set of
program eﬀects are TOT parameters for which treatment is deﬁned as “moving through the MTO
program.” Since no one can move through the MTO program unless assigned treatment, there
are no always-takers of this treatment, and so TOT and LATE parameters are identical. These
TOT eﬀects are all qualitatively similar to the ITT eﬀects just reviewed, but with a slightly larger
magnitude since they are the ITT eﬀects divided by the probability of receiving treatment, which
in this case is estimated in Table F9 of Kling et al. (2007b) to be 0.467. For example, the TOT
eﬀect of this treatment was a 10 percentage point decrease in adult obesity, compared with an ITT
10This view is shared by most of the inﬂuential articles on MTO, including Kling et al. (2007a), Kling et al. (2005),
Sanbonmatsu et al. (2006), Ludwig (2010), and even Sampson (2008).
11Remember that we assume there are no deﬁers.
12eﬀect of a 5 percentage point decrease (Kling et al. (2007a)).
On the other hand, careful consideration of selection into treatment is likely to have major
implications for the interpretation of evidence from MTO if we are interested in understanding
neighborhood eﬀects. If, for example, treatment were deﬁned to be “moving to a neighborhood
with characteristic x,” where x were low poverty, high employment, or a high degree of personal
safety, then there would be always-takers, and the TOT and LATE parameters would no longer
the same. Looking at Equations 7 and 8, in this case the LATE parameter would no longer be
the ITT eﬀect normalized by the percent of people moving, but rather would become the ITT
eﬀect normalized by the percent of households induced into treatment by the instrument. This
distinction will have major implications, as it allows for the possibility of dramatically diﬀerent
program (TOT) and neighborhood (LATE) eﬀects. The remainder of this section will provide
examples and estimates of LATEs to clarify that while parameters estimated in the literature do
not suﬀer from selection bias (Ludwig et al. (2008)), selection into treatment is an inescapable
issue if one seeks to learn about neighborhood eﬀects from MTO (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey
(2008)).
5.1 Selection into Treatment and LATE Parameters
We brieﬂy consider an example to help illustrate how selection into treatment drives LATE
estimates. Deﬁne treatment as moving through the MTO program, and suppose that the ITT
eﬀect on log wages is 0.030. According to Table F9 in Kling et al. (2007b), E[D|Z = 1]−E[D|Z =
0] = 0.467 for the experimental group under this deﬁnition of treatment. Thus
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]





In this hypothetical example, the LATE estimates that moving through the MTO program causally
increased wages by 6.4%.
Now suppose that treatment is deﬁned as moving to an integrated neighborhood (ie, a neighbor-
hood in which at least 50% of residents are white). According to Table F2 of Kling et al. (2007b),
E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.065 for the experimental group under this deﬁnition of treatment.
This will yield:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]





Under this hypothetical case, moves to integrated neighborhoods induced by MTO would have
causally increased wages by 46%! Note that not only has the LATE point estimate increased
dramatically here, but the subgroup of compliers to which this estimate applies has shrunk dra-
matically.
To further illustrate the importance of selection into treatment for interpreting LATE parame-
ters, now suppose that we observe a LATE for a given deﬁnition of treatment. Diﬀerent eﬀects and
13patterns of selection into treatment on the part of compliers and always-takers could generate this
parameter value. Deﬁne treatment as “moving to a neighborhood with a poverty rate of no more
than 20%,” and assume that 50% of those assigned treatment (ie, were given a housing voucher)
selected into treatment. Let Y now denote change in log wages, and suppose that moving to a
neighborhood with less than 20% poverty increases both compliers’ and always-takers’ wages by
10%. Then we might have the following scenario if 40% are compliers:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
[.4   0.10 + .1   0.10 + .5   0] − [.1   0.10 + .9   0]
.5 − .1
= 0.10.
Note that the LATE is not informative about the eﬀect on always-takers’ wages. If compliers’
wages increased by 10% but always-takers’ wages increased by 20%, then the LATE would still be:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
[.4   0.10 + .1   0.20 + .5   0] − [.1   0.20 + .9   0]
.5 − .1
= 0.10.
As well, note that if the group of compliers shrinks dramatically, the interpretation of the LATE
changes while its value stays the same. Suppose that now 40% of the population are always-takers,
and only 10% are compliers. In this case the LATE is:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
[.1   0.10 + .4   0.20 + .5   0] − [.4   0.20 + .6   0]
.5 − .4
= 0.10.
These hypothetical examples help to illustrate two crucial points about LATE parameters.
First, LATE estimates can only be understood after deﬁning treatment and determining the share
of the population induced to select into this treatment by the instrument. Second, LATE param-
eters are the eﬀects of moves to neighborhoods with particular characteristics induced by MTO.
Other instruments would likely have induced other subpopulations to select into the deﬁned neigh-
borhood treatment, and thus would almost certainly yield diﬀerent LATEs for a given deﬁnition
of treatment. For example, although only about 20% of families in Gautreaux were compliers
(Ludwig et al. (2008)), its alternative rules for moving likely induced a greater share of compliers
for many neighborhood treatments than MTO. Thus the LATE parameters deﬁned by MTO are
only a subset of possible neighborhood eﬀects, even amongst those resulting from housing mobil-
ity programs. Diﬀerent housing mobility programs designed to induce moves to diﬀerent types of
neighborhoods could plausibly result in diﬀerent neighborhood eﬀects.
5.2 Preliminary LATE Estimates for Alternative Deﬁnitions of Treatment
To learn about neighborhood eﬀects from MTO, we now present various deﬁnitions of treatment.
Since the threshold for low poverty in the design of MTO was set at the median Census tract
level poverty rate in 1990, 10% (Goering (2003)), reasonable cutoﬀs for deﬁning neighborhood
treatments would be families moving to a neighborhood at or above the national median for a
given characteristic in 1990. Table 2 shows the median US census tract characteristics in 1990 and
2000 for several neighborhood characteristics that one might believe aﬀect outcomes.
14None of the LATE parameters deﬁned with respect to the median US Census tract characteris-
tics as shown in Table 2 may be estimated with publicly available data from MTO. Thus this paper
is only able to present a preliminary analysis of LATE estimates. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the
author has submitted a request for access to the MTO Restricted Access Data. A full analysis will
be performed upon receipt of the Restricted Access Data.
The LATE parameters reported in this analysis are those on adult outcomes for the experimental
group. The estimates are constructed by comparing ITT eﬀects using the Wald estimator from
Equation 7:
βLATE(Z = 1,Z = 0) =
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0]
E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
.
All estimates are taken from Kling et al. (2007b).12
5.2.1 Moving to a Low-Poverty Neighborhood
Deﬁne treatment as moving to a census tract in which the poverty rate was below 30%. Then
according to Table F2 in Kling et al. (2007b), E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.345 for the exper-
imental group. Note that by using 30% poverty as a cutoﬀ for treatment, under this deﬁnition
many more families will select into treatment than under the deﬁnition using the 1990 median
census tract poverty rate of 10%. Table 3 shows LATE estimates for neighborhood eﬀects on adult
outcomes. This is one neighborhood eﬀect about which we have learned much through MTO.
LATE parameters of this neighborhood eﬀect do not look tremendously diﬀerent than the TOT
parameters found in the literature; such moves do not have large eﬀects on adult outcomes.
5.2.2 Moving to a Neighborhood with a High Degree of Personal Safety
Now suppose that we are interested in how personal safety aﬀects adult outcomes (Anderson
(1999)). We might deﬁne treatment either as “moving to a neighborhood in which one has not
seen illicit drugs being sold or used during the past 30 days,” or alternatively as “moving to a
neighborhood in which the residents believe streets are safe or very safe at night.” According to
Table F9 of Kling et al. (2007b), E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.118 under the ﬁrst deﬁnition and
E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.141 under the second deﬁnition. Tables 4 and 5 show LATEs for
these neighborhood treatments. Since we are normalizing the original ITT eﬀects by a much smaller
share of compliers, the LATE parameters become much larger than the earlier LATEs of moving to
a low-poverty neighborhood. Although not precisely estimated in this preliminary analysis, point
estimates suggest that eﬀects from this neighborhood treatment could be large.
12Standard errors are calculated using a Taylor approximation for the variance of the ratio of two random variables



















We assume Cov(X,Y ) = 0, so these are conservative standard errors.
155.2.3 Moving to an Integrated Neighborhood
Deﬁne treatment as moving to a neighborhood with less than 50% of residents being minori-
ties. According to Table F2 of Kling et al. (2007b), E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] = 0.065 for the
experimental group. Table 6 shows LATEs for this neighborhood treatment. Again, although these
LATEs are not precisely estimated in this preliminary analysis, point estimates suggest that eﬀects
from this neighborhood treatment could be large.
5.2.4 Moving to a Neighborhood with High Levels of Collective Eﬃcacy
Finally, suppose that we are interested in how neighborhood-level collective eﬃcacy aﬀects adult
outcomes (Sampson et al. (1997)). We might deﬁne treatment either as “moving to a neighborhood
in which residents believe neighbors are likely to intervene against graﬃti,” or alternatively as
“moving to a neighborhood in which residents believe their neighbors are likely to intervene if they
encounter kids skipping school.” Tables 7 and 8 show LATEs for these neighborhood treatments. A
similar pattern is again observed; a smaller share of compliers makes the point estimates of LATEs
from this neighborhood treatment much larger than the LATEs from the low-poverty treatment.
5.2.5 Further Neighborhood Treatments
Once restricted access data is obtained, the author will estimate LATE parameters for neigh-
borhood eﬀects deﬁned for the treatments found in Table 2, among others. Some of the LATE
parameters to be estimated will address the eﬀects of moving to:
• a neighborhood with a high labor force participation rate
• a high quality school (as measured by both test scores and student/teacher ratios)
• a neighborhood with high educational attainment (as measured by attainment of both bach-
elor’s degrees and high school diplomas)
• a neighborhood with a high rate of two-parent families
• a neighborhood with high wealth
6 Conclusion
Estimating LATEs from MTO helps to clarify that while parameters estimated in the literature
do not suﬀer from selection bias (Ludwig et al. (2008)), selection into treatment is an inescapable
issue if one seeks to learn about neighborhood eﬀects from MTO (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey
(2008)). Preliminary estimates indicate that many LATE neighborhood eﬀects will be larger than
the TOT program eﬀects from MTO. This re-interpretation of the MTO data suggests two im-
portant conclusions related to the current understanding of neighborhood eﬀects and programs.
First, if alternative housing mobility programs were designed to induce moves to neighborhoods
16with characteristics other than low poverty, it is entirely feasible that such programs might induce
larger eﬀects than MTO. Second, initial LATE estimates appear to reconcile the evidence from
MTO with prevailing theories of neighborhood eﬀects (Wilson (1987)).
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1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Year
Black 15−24 Black 25−34 Black 35−44
White 15−24 White 25−34 White 35−44
Source:  CDC/NCHS: Health, United States, 1981−2009
By Race and Age
Homicide Rate of Males in the US
Figure 1: Homicide Rate of Males
21Figure 2a: Type 1 Households: µ1(Z = 0) < µ1(Z = 1)
µ1(Z)
U1
[µ1(Z = 1) < 0
⇒ Never-taker]
[µ1(Z = 0) > 1
⇒ Always-taker]
0 1
µ1(Z = 1) µ1(Z = 0)
0 1
Always-taker Complier Never-taker
Figure 2b: Type 2 Households: µ2(Z = 1) < µ2(Z = 0)
µ2(Z)
U2
[µ2(Z = 0) < 0
⇒ Never-taker]
[µ2(Z = 1) > 0
⇒ Always-taker]
0 1
µ2(Z = 0) µ2(Z = 1)
0 1
Always-taker Deﬁer Never-taker
D∗ = µ(Z) − U, D = 1{D∗ ≥ 0}, U ∼ U[0,1].
Figure 2: Selection into Treatment
22Tables
Table 1: D(Z): Treatment as a Function of Assigned Treatment
D(Z) D(0)
D 0 1
D(1) 0 Never-taker Deﬁer
1 Complier Always-taker




White 91.69 85.23 Summary File 1
Unemployed (Male) 5.59 4.83 Age≥16, Summary File 3
Unemployed (Female) 5.40 4.80 Age≥16, Summary File 3
Labor Force Participation Rate (Male) 74.95 71.73 Age≥16, Summary File 3
Labor Force Participation Rate (Female) 56.13 57.43 Age≥16, Summary File 3
Residents with ≥HS Diploma 75.61 82.21 Age≥25, Summary File 3
Residents with ≥BA 14.14 17.86 Age≥25, Summary File 3
Two-Parent Families 82.21 72.72 Family Households, Summary File 3
2
4Table 3: Eﬀects of Moving to a Low Poverty Neighborhood (≤ 30% Poverty Rate) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.043 0.015 (0.021) 0.345 (0.018)
(0.42) Table F3 Table F2
Earnings in 2001 362 125 (449)
(154) Table F3
Physical Health –0.035 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (0.47) Table F6
Mental Health –0.261 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (0.74) Table F6
2
5Table 4: Eﬀects of Moving to a Safe Neighborhood (Believe Safe at Night) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.106 0.015 (0.021) 0.141 (0.022)
(1.03) Table F3 Table F9
Earnings in 2001 887 125 (449)
(945) Table F3
Physical Health –0.085 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (1.15) Table F6
Mental Health –0.638 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (1.92) Table F6
2
6Table 5: Eﬀects of Moving to a Safe Neighborhood (Not Seen Drugs) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.127 0.015 (0.021) 0.118 (0.022)
(1.24) Table F3 Table F9
Earnings in 2001 1,059 125 (449)
(1,344) Table F3
Physical Health –0.102 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (1.37) Table F6
Mental Health –0.763 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (2.35) Table F6
2
7Table 6: Eﬀects of Moving to an Integrated Neighborhood (≥ 50% White) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.231 0.015 (0.021) 0.065 (0.015)
(2.27) Table F3 Table F2
Earnings in 2001 1,923 125 (449)
(3,638) Table F3
Physical Health –0.185 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (2.50) Table F6
Mental Health –1.385 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (4.69) Table F6
2
8Table 7: Eﬀects of Moving to a Neighborhood with High Collective Eﬃcacy (Neighbors Intervene Against Graﬃti) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.090 0.015 (0.021) 0.166 (0.049)
(0.88) Table F3 Table G5
Earnings in 2001 753 125 (449)
(1,012) Table F3
Physical Health –0.072 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (0.98) Table F6
Mental Health –0.542 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (1.69) Table F6
2
9Table 8: Eﬀects of Moving to a Neighborhood with High Collective Eﬃcacy (Neighbors Intervene if Kids Skipping School) due to MTO
(Source of ITT Estimates: Kling et al. (2007b))
E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0]
Outcome   βLATE Source Source
Adult Outcomes
Employed 0.152 0.015 (0.021) 0.099 (0.053)
(1.51) Table F3 Table G5
Earnings in 2001 1,263 125 (449)
(2,944) Table F3
Physical Health –0.121 –0.012 (0.026)
Has fair/poor health (1.65) Table F6
Mental Health –0.909 –0.090 (0.064)
K6 z-score of psych. stress (3.32) Table F6
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